Introduction
Enlargement is often called the most successful foreign policy of the European Union (EU). The attractiveness of EU membership and the strict political conditionality attached to the accession process have vested the EU with considerable transformative power in the applicant countries (Grabbe 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005) . After the breakdown of Soviet communism and hegemony in Eastern Europe, enlargement has been credited with having contributed significantly to economic recovery, peace and stability as well as democratization in the transition countries of the region.
With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007 , the Fifth Enlargement of the EU has come to a close. Whereas the Western Balkans and Turkey continue to have a membership perspective, the EU has devised the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) for the remaining countries of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean as an alternative to accession. It is an open question, however, whether ENP will be able to produce similarly positive effects as enlargement.
In recent years, the comparative study of EU democracy promotion has become the subject of several book-length studies (Kelley 2004; Kubicek 2003; Pridham 2005; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Youngs 2001 ). These studies concur on a number of substantive findings regarding the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion.
Above all, they agree that the use of accession conditionality has been paramount. First, political accession conditionality, that is, the credible perspective of becoming an EU member after thorough democratic reform, has been the most effective among the EU's strategies and instruments (others being social influence or persuasion, for instance).
Second, outside of Europe, where the target countries of EU democracy promotion did not have a membership perspective, the EU used its political conditionality inconsistently and rather unsuccessfully on the whole. In sum, while even highly credible accession conditionality requires favorable domestic political conditions in the target countries to be fully effective, it has proven to be a necessary condition of successful EU democracy promotion. And while this literature would not claim that EU accession conditionality was more important than domestic conditions of democratization, it demonstrates that in many cases the EU's external incentives have been instrumental in overcoming domestic obstacles to further democratic reform.
In addition, the recent studies of EU democracy promotion share several theoretical and methodological characteristics. First, they generally adhere to the agency-oriented approach of transition theory, which focuses on strategic constellations and political choices of state leaders and challengers to explain regime change and its outcomes (see e.g. O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991) . In this perspective, the EU is conceived of as an (additional) actor in the transition process, which provides external restrictions and opportunities to the choices of elites and counter-elites. Second, the studies are mainly based on comparative case study designs and (with the exception of Youngs 2001) have focused empirically on the candidates for EU membership.
Consequently, the recent literature on EU democracy promotion may be accused of two major design problems potentially leading to bias and limited generality. On the one hand, given their focus on EU agency and EU interaction with domestic elites in the target countries, these studies may have unduly neglected socioeconomic development as an additional or alternative and, as modernization theorists would claim, more fundamental cause of democratization. In addition, the emphasis on the EU as an international organization and its strategy of conditionality may sideline and overlook more general diffusion effects having to do with other transnational and international actors and interactions. As a consequence, the studies of EU democracy promotion may systematically overestimate the relevance of EU incentives in the democratization process and, technically speaking, introduce omitted variable bias into the analysis.
Second, the empirical focus on countries with a general membership perspective (and thus favorable conditions of EU impact) introduces uncertainty into the findings and may limit their generality. It leaves the reader wondering how variation in the size and credibility of EU conditionality might impact on its effectiveness.
In our paper, we address these potential sources of bias and uncertainty. On the one hand, we take into account core variables of structural, socioeconomic accounts of democratization as well as several proxies for diffuse international and transnational influences beyond the specific incentives of the EU. Second, we include 36 countries of the "European neighborhood" and thus almost all ex-communist and Mediterranean countries from the late 1980s to the beginning of the 21 st century. Finally, in order to deal with this expanded data set, we move from qualitative, comparative analysis to panel regression. The goal of this expanded analysis is, first, to put the state of the art in the study of EU democracy promotion to a demanding test and, second, to see what we can learn from the analysis of the past for the prospects of EU democracy promotion after enlargement.
The study will show that EU accession conditionality still proves to have been a strong and significant factor in European democratization processes if the entire region is taken into account and if core alternative explanations are controlled for. By the same token, however, the study suggests that the impact of EU democracy promotion will be severely weakened and much less consistent where EU incentives are smaller -as is the case for those countries of the European neighborhood that do not have a membership perspective. The good news for theory is bad news for policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents political conditionality, economic development, and transnational exchange as alternative and complementary mechanisms of democratization. Section 3 describes the design of the study, and section 4 discusses the results of the analysis including a series of alternative estimations and model specifications to check their robustness. Section 5 concludes.
Mechanisms of democratization: political conditionality, economic development, and transnational exchange
In this section, we present three different mechanisms of democratization, which are potentially influential in the EU's European neighborhood. We start with political conditionality, the main mechanism under study here. We then present two alternative mechanisms: economic development and transnational exchange. At the end of the section, we discuss potential causal connections between these mechanisms.
Political Conditionality
In using political conditionality, the EU sets the adoption of democratic rules and practices as conditions that the target countries have to fulfill in order to receive rewards such as financial assistance, some kind of contractual association, or -ultimatelymembership. EU conditionality is mainly positive, that is, the EU offers and withholds carrots but does not carry a big stick (Smith 2001; Youngs 2001: 192) . Countries that fail to meet the criteria are simply denied assistance, association or membership and left behind in the competition for EU funds and the 'regatta' for accession. The EU generally does not inflict extra punishment (in addition to withholding the conditional reward) on non-compliant governments. Moreover, the EU does not give extra support to those who fail to meet the conditions either. Rather, it regularly exhorts the target governments that it is their own responsibility to create the conditions to be rewarded (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 31-41) .
The most general political conditionality hypothesis can be stated as follows: The level of democracy in the neighboring countries of the EU increases with the size and the credibility of the EU's conditional incentives.
In general, adopting liberal political norms (such as human rights, democratic elections, open contestation for office, and the rule of law) constitutes a loss in autonomy for the target governments. These political disincentives need to be balanced in kind by tangible incentives such as military protection or economic assistance to improve the security and the welfare of the state. In addition, effectiveness will increase with the size of incentives.
Accordingly, the promise of enlargement should be more powerful than the promise of association or assistance, and the impact of the EU on candidates for membership should be stronger than on outside states not considered potential EU members. Only the highest international rewards -those associated with EU membership -can be expected to balance substantial domestic power costs.
Finally, the conditionality need to be credible both with regard to the EU's threat to withhold the rewards in case of non-compliance and, conversely, the EU's promise to deliver the reward in case of compliance. In general, the credibility of the threat has always been present in the relations between the EU and its neighborhood.
Interdependence is highly asymmetrical in favor of the EU. Whereas the neighboring countries are only of marginal importance to the EU economy, they are often heavily dependent on the EU market and will benefit much more strongly from association and accession than the EU member states (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2005: 201) .
On the other hand, however, the EU must be capable and willing to pay the rewards.
The higher the costs of the rewards to the EU are, the more doubtful their eventual payment to the target countries will be. On the basis of this reasoning, assistance and association have generally been more credible rewards than accession because the commitment on the part of the EU is low. By contrast, Eastern enlargement involves substantial costs to the organization, which -although far from being prohibitive -are likely to exceed the marginal benefits of most member states (Schimmelfennig 2003: 52-66 ).
It took several years, indeed, to overcome the reticence and opposition of a majority of member governments and to commit the EU firmly to enlargement. It was not before 1993 that the EU had made a general decision to accept new members from the transition countries and it took the EU until 1997 to open accession negotiations with the democratically most consolidated states among them. These decisions greatly strengthened the credibility of both the promise to enlarge and the threat to exclude reform laggards -and the impact of political conditionality on those countries that were not allowed to participate in the first round of negotiations.
In sum, we claim that the impact of the EU on democratization in the neighboring countries will be a function of the size and credibility of the rewards that it offers in return for democratization steps.
Economic Development
According to modernization theory, democracy is a function of the level of social and economic development of a country. In his pioneering work, Seymour Martin Lipset (1959; 1960 ) studied the social conditions or 'requisites' that support democracy and identified 'economic development', broadly understood as a syndrome of wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education, as the most important one. Economic development goes together with better education, less poverty, the creation of a large middle-class, and a competent civil service. It thereby mitigates the class struggle and promotes cross-cutting cleavages. In addition, it nurtures a belief in tolerance and gradualism and reduces commitment to extremist ideologies. In sum: "The more well-todo a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy" (Lipset 1960: 31) .
The relationship between economic well-being and democracy has been tested on the basis of various indicators, methods and in comparison with many alternative factors and has proven highly robust (Diamond 1992; Lipset 1994 
Transnational Exchange
Even if one accepts that democratization does not only depend on domestic conditions but is also conditional on international factors, one may still doubt that intergovernmental organizations and their political conditionality are the most relevant factors. Democracypromoting influences may also stem from transnational relations, that is, cross-border interactions and exchanges, in which at least one actor is non-governmental. Just as in economic development, democracy promotion is predominantly societal and bottom-up but it is, at the same time, international rather than domestic (Levitsky and Way 2005) .
Channels and instruments of transnational exchange can be highly diverse. They comprise economic exchanges such as trade and investment; personal interactions through various means of communication, tourism, and academic exchanges; and cultural and informational influences via the media, churches, or cultural performances.
The effects of these interactions and exchanges on democratization are diverse as well.
Some of them are direct and short-term in the sense that they have an immediate impact on the political struggle between pro-and anti-democratic forces in the country.
Newspapers and broadcasts from abroad and external financial and technical support for the opponents are examples. International demonstration effects generated by successful democratic transitions in another country may encourage the democratic opposition and counter-elites to push for democratization. Other effects, however, work indirectly and in the longer term. The intensification of trade, for instance, may make society more affluent and induce societal groups to demand civil liberties and political rights. It also brings people from established democracies in contact with people from non-democratic countries, thus facilitating the spread of ideas and change of attitudes.
The same can be expected from non-economic interactions such as cultural and academic exchanges increasing the level of education as a social requisite of democracy or constituting a channel for transmitting beliefs and desires that favor democratization.
As a general hypothesis subsuming the various channels, instruments and effects of transnational exchange, we propose that the level of democracy in a country increases with the intensity of the transnational linkages that it entertains with (other) democratic countries in its international environment.

Causal interactions
Theoretically, we can think of several ways in which these mechanisms influence democratization in the European Neighborhood. To some extent, we assume them to work independently of each other. In this perspective, and under the conditions specified for each mechanism, political conditionality, economic development, and transnational exchange each contribute their share to overall progress in democracy. In addition, however, it seems plausible to assume that political conditionality interacts in two ways with economic development, on the one hand, and transnational exchange, on the other.
First, conditionality may have a causal impact on both economic development and transnational exchange. Certainly, conditional EU assistance, cooperation, and market access are likely to contribute to the wealth of nonmember countries and to the intensity of transnational exchanges and thereby strengthen these alternative mechanisms of democratization. For two reasons, however, we do no think that this causal interaction poses a serious problem for our study. On the one hand, conditionality only contributes significantly to economic development and linkage after political conditions have been fulfilled. That is, target countries have to reach certain levels of democracy before assistance, cooperation and market access are granted or enhanced. Thus, for each level of incentives offered, conditionality will have an impact on democracy ahead of having an impact on either economic development or transnational exchange. Therefore, the effects of conditionality can be largely separated from those of the other mechanisms and problems of endogeneity should not loom large. On the other hand, the remaining causal interactions (and endogeneity) would lead the analysis to understate rather than overstate the independent effects of conditionality that we seek to establish.
Second, economic development and transnational exchange may have a causal impact on both conditionality and democracy. One may assume that high economic development and intense transnational interactions will lead the EU to offer high incentives to the target countries of democracy promotion. This would reduce the relationship between political conditionality and democracy to a (partially) spurious one.
It is exactly for this reason that we include economic development and transnational exchange in our empirical model. 1 Finally, one may suspect reverse causality. Accordingly, countries that have made democratic progress first would then prompt the EU to offer them association or membership, whereas we assume that the offer of association or membership triggers democratic progress. It is certainly true that in the frontrunners of democratization in the region (such as Hungary and Poland), significant steps toward democracy had been taken before the EU offered association or membership. In most cases, however, the EU has offered association and membership to countries that had not reached high levels of democracy yet. In particular, the Balkans (first Bulgaria and Romania, then the 'Western Balkans') were granted an association and membership perspective when they still had serious democratic deficits and the Barcelona Process offered the Mediterranean countries association regardless of their systems of rule. The dependent variable 'democracy' is measured by the Political Rights rating of Freedom House (2005) . To obtain interpretable results, data are reversed to a scale from 0 (no democracy) to 6 (full democracy). Data are available from 1988 for all countries which were independent by then, from 1990 for Czech Republic and Slovenia, from 1991 for (almost all of) the other successor states of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. In some countries (Bulgaria, Algeria, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey) , "turmoil" is reported for 1990, and we therefore imputed the value for 1989. To test for the robustness of our findings, one set of estimates uses the Civil Liberties (model 9)
rather than the Political Rights score by Freedom House, and another set of estimates excludes all those countries from the analysis, in which democratization was already far advanced or consolidated (model 10). These are countries rated as "free" by Freedom
House (democracy values of 5 and 6 according to our scale) for a given year.
See Table 1 for our conceptualization of political conditionality. The size and credibility of incentives refer to the time during which they were offered to the target countries as the highest available incentives in principle -not when association or accession negotiations started (see Appendix B for the distribution of country-years across these categories).
They remain valid even after the target countries have been granted association or membership because treaties with third countries can be suspended, and members can be deprived of their voting rights, when they violate fundamental democratic norms.
In 1988, the starting year of our analysis, the Eastern European countries were generally without any tangible incentives provided by the EU ( Agreements' of association ('1/2'). Once they had the chance to sign Europe Agreements, the size of incentives increased ('2/2'). These association agreements were not only linked to rather strict political conditionality (credibility of the threat), they also raised the expectations of eventual membership (credibility of the promise). By contrast, the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements offered similar incentives without the same strict political conditionality and without the same membership perspective ('2/1').
They are therefore classified as low-credibility association. According to our theoretical considerations, the effect of political conditionality on democratization is best conceived of as an interaction effect of the size and credibility of EU incentives. High incentives are a necessary but not sufficient condition of EU impact unless these incentives are also credible. Equally, highly credible but substantively small rewards will not be an effective lever for democratic reforms. We use the "0" category for size (no tangible incentives) as the reference category against which we evaluate the effects of the other combinations in the data set (1/0, 1/1, 1/2, 2/1, 2/2, 3/1, and 3/2). The measurement of transnational exchanges presented us with more difficulties because data availability for such interactions as visits, communication, or academic exchange proved extremely limited given the extensive empirical scope of our study.
Except for trade, we therefore turn to proxies based on the assumption that the intensity of exchanges increases with geographical proximity. Muslim countries have been particularly resistant to the waves of democratization that have rolled through the international system (e.g. Huntington 1991; Lewis 1996) . We therefore expect a negative effect of Muslim culture on democratization.
Appendix C reports the bivariate correlations between the independent variables employed. The highest intercorrelations (>.5) are not within the variable blocs but between socio-economic and diffusion variables on the one and the conditionality dummies, on the other. Particularly, countries with a low credibility for partnership with the EU are unlikely to have democratic neighbors, while countries with a hardly credible association perspective are likely to be Muslim. Therefore, it may be difficult to identify the separate effects of these variables, and the relations between the correlated variables may be unstable (Judge et al.1982: 860) . But none of the correlations is a priori too high for joint introduction. Since we assume a causal structure in which geography, culture, economy are the causes, and the EU's conditionality is the effect, in the case of multicollinearity only 'false-negative' results for the control variables could occur.
Influences promoting democracy take some time to come into effect. Change is most likely to take place as a result of elections leading to the defeat of less democratic incumbents or, in the case of election fraud, to popular unrest causing the downfall of the old regime. In accordance with the standard four-year electoral rhythm, we expect the empirical relations to be highest with using a time lag of four years. That is, we correlate the independent variables for one year (and country) with the democracy measure four years later. This effectively restricts our period of analysis from 1988 to 2000 for the independent variables. Again, in order to check the robustness of our findings, we tried other lags as well.
We use a random effects probit estimation to account both for the ordinal structure of the democracy measurement and for the panel structure of the data, using Stata's GLLAMM module. In this estimation, the country variable is used as a unit identifier in a multi-level probit regression. The ordered probit estimation accounts correctly for the Likert-like nature of Freedom House's democracy data, which are both stepwise and censored. Finally, we estimated both level and change models. In the first case, we seek to explain the effect of our independent variables on the level of democracy in each country and year. The level is measured by our adapted absolute Freedom House score. In the latter case, we seek to explain the change in democracy levels from the previous year. Table 2 reports the regression results for our standard analysis, which uses the level of political rights as the dependent variable and a four-year lag for all countries. What we would ideally like to see is a set of coefficients for the conditionality dummies that are highly significant, positive, and increase from lower to higher sizes of incentives and credibility. The first estimation (1) focuses on our main explanatory variable, the size and credibility of EU incentives. In contrast to weak incentives ('0' to '2/1'), from highly credible association ('2/2') upwards, the effect of conditionality is significant, strong, and consistent.
Results
Model (2) includes the economic development and transnational exchange controls. Far from reducing the strength and significance of political conditionality, adding the control variables rather improves the performance of incentives and credibility. In particular, controlling for the specific obstacles to democratization in Muslim countries seems to turn the negative signs of the coefficients for lower levels of conditionality positive. Yet, the effects of conditionality below the threshold of association remain inconsistent and insignificant. The variables for the alternative mechanisms of democratization produce mixed results. As to economic development, wealth is surprisingly insignificant, whereas life expectancy has a highly significant positive impact. Regarding transnational exchange, the two proxies (proximity to the EU and the democratic neighborhood) are significantly and positively correlated with the level of political rights. EU trade share, however, has the wrong sign. Models (3) and (4) use different specifications of the exchange proxies. In model (3), we use gravity toward the EU (which turns the signs for proximity and democratic neighborhood negative when estimated together). The results are structurally similar to model (2) but gravity is more highly significant than either proximity to the EU or a democratic neighborhood. Finally, model (4) uses a common factor of proximity, democratic neighborhood and gravity derived from factor analysis. In sum, however specified, the geographic proxies for transnational exchange prove robustly significant and positively correlated with the level of democracy in neighboring countries. This seems to indicate that general and diffuse cross-border exchanges do indeed matter.
It needs to be stressed that the coefficients in the ordered probit model refer to the estimated threshold values ('cut points') for the different Likert-scale steps (Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh 2005) . They add up to 9.2 rather than 6, which would be the difference between completely non-democratic and fully democratic countries according the Freedom House scale. To obtain safely interpretable estimates, we estimate a linear random-effects, a linear fixed-effects, and an OLS regression model (estimations 5-7;
see Table 3 ). Another reason for the inclusion of these estimations is to use them as a test for robustness of the results against changes in estimation method. All in all, both alternative estimations produce less satisfying results than the randomeffects ordered probit model but the results for political conditionality offering a membership perspective remain positive and highly significant.
How substantive are the conditionality effects? As stated above, the coefficients of the random-effects ordered probit estimation are difficult to interpret and appear to be inflated. Estimation (7) therefore uses a simple ordinary least squares estimation. Its coefficients are most easily interpreted and show that countries, which are offered an EU membership perspective, are on average more than three points above those without tangible EU incentives (on the seven point Freedom House political rights scale). This represents a qualitative leap from a non-democratic to a democratic country.
Finally, one may ask how much the results may be driven by the fact that EU conditionality may itself be a result of the variables we controlled for. To test this 'collinearity hypothesis', we replaced each conditionality dummy with the residual (i.e.
the error term) of a linear regression of this dummy on the six control variables of model (2). Estimation (8) shows that all seven dummy regressions are highly significant: the mean absolute t-statistics of each control variable for the seven dummy regressions is above 2.6. This indicates that EU conditionality is indeed strongly tied to a country's situation. Nevertheless, whereas estimation (8) increases the effect of the control variables considerably (among these, again, the counter-intuitive negative effect of EU trade share), it leaves the coefficients of the conditionality variables almost unchanged.
To further test the robustness of these results, we apply several changes to the specification of our basic model (model 2). Model (9) in Table 4 increases the time lag from four to five years. This reduces the significance of the conditionality values, but the signs remain correct and accession conditionality still remains statistically significant. . This poor result may be due to the fact that variance in the conditionality changes is rather limited. Therefore we apply a measure which empirically condenses the effects of conditionality changes (using the empirical weights of model 8) and arrive at the result that, taken altogether, EU conditionality has a strongly significant effect even when analyzing changes in democratic performance.
To give an overview of how robustly significant the different combinations of the size and credibility of EU incentives proved across different estimation methods and model specifications, Figure 1 provides box plots of the z-or t-statistics for each of the six conditionality dummies over the 12 models estimated. The box plots clearly reveal that the offer of membership is the only reliable EU incentive for promoting democracy in the European neighbourhood, whereas all incentives short of a credible association perspective have not been sufficiently significant to be counted upon as effective instruments of democracy promotion. Credible association conditionality is a borderline case.
Conclusions
Is EU democracy promotion in its neighborhood relevant and effective -and if so, under which conditions? This study started from core findings established by recent comparative analyses of EU democracy promotion in the CEECs: that the EU has successfully promoted democracy in its neighborhood; that it owes its success to the use of political conditionality; and that the effectiveness of political conditionality depends on a credible membership perspective for the target countries. It has been the main purpose of this study to put these findings to a demanding test, first, by controlling for economic development and transnational exchanges as alternative mechanisms of democratization and, second, by increasing the number of observations to a large number (36) of target countries in the European neighborhood and across a long time period (13 years). In addition, the study was motivated by the question how effective EU democracy promotion would remain after the completion of the Fifth Enlargement.
We conclude from our analysis that EU political accession conditionality has passed the test. Across a variety of model specifications and estimations, and with plausible alternative factors of democratization controlled for, it has proven to be a robustly significant, strong and positive correlate of democratization in the European neighborhood. Even when the membership incentives lacked credibility, i.e. when the membership promise was uncertain, the impact of EU political conditionality was statistically strong and robust. Not any kind of conditionality works, however. Short of a membership perspective, association and partnership conditionality did not perform consistently better than no or weak conditionality -credible accession conditionality being a borderline case.
The alternative mechanisms of democratization were included in the analysis as controls rather than as test variables in their own right. The results should therefore not be interpreted as substantive findings on the causal relevance of economic development or transnational exchange. In view of the overwhelming empirical evidence in support of wealth (GDP per capita) as factor of democratization, however, its statistical performance in our analysis was less than impressive. By contrast, life expectancy proved highly robust. This might indicate that, rather than pure income, quality of life more broadly defined, may be more relevant in the region. The transnational exchange variables display the same mixed picture. Whereas the share of EU trade failed completely as an explanatory variable, the geographic proxies for the intensity of transnational transactions performed reasonably well overall. The highly varied kinds and impacts of transnational exchange that are covered by these proxies would need to be disentangled and analyzed separately, however, in future research.
Our final conclusions pertain to policy and the prospects of EU political conditionality.
Although the European Neighborhood Policy, which has only become operative in 2005, and general developments after the completion of the Fifth Enlargement have not been a subject of the analysis, the findings may be extrapolated with some caution. According to our typology, the ENP would generally be classified as a low-credibility association policy because it explicitly excludes a membership perspective for the ENP countries and does not set high political standards for participation. It would thus not differ qualitatively from the European Mediterranean Policy (EMP). If the EMP experience and our analysis have any predictive value, the ENP will have at best uncertain and inconsistent effects as a This is not to say that the EU's impact will necessarily be negligible without a membership perspective. As our results demonstrate, the impact of credible association has been clearly more consistent than that of association without credible conditionality (see Figure 1) . In this view, the lack of normative consistency in the EU's relations with non-candidate countries may be an obstacle to the effectiveness of political conditionality that could be removed without expanding the Union further. Membership (3), high credibility (2) Membership (3), low credibility (1) Association (2), high credibility (2) Association (2), low credibility (1) Partnership (1), high credibility (2) Partnership (1), low credibility (1) Partnership (1) 
